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The conceptual genealogy of network-centric warfare (NCW) can be traced to the 
path-breaking speculative work done by Soviet military theorists in the 1970s, which 
was later adopted and modified by leading Western theoreticians and practitioners 
of war. By the 1980s, we were already talking about the “system of systems” and a 
“revolution in military affairs”, and by the mid-1990s, the first tentative “speculations 
on armed conflict in a time of free silicon” were being offered. Against this genealogical 
backdrop, NCW, as we understand it today, refers to the growing ensemble of…
...military operations enabled by the networking of the force, [which, in 
turn,] provide[s] it with access to a new, previously unreachable region of the 
information domain. The ability to operate in this region provides warfighters 
with a new type of information advantage, an advantage broadly characterized 
by significantly improved capabilities for sharing and accessing information. 
Network-centric warfare enables warfighters to leverage this information 
advantage to dramatically increase combat power through self-synchronization 
and other network-centric operations.1
A close analysis of the current and emergent literature on war and its 
conduct shows us that there are two distinct lines of thought regarding NCW. For 
Dr Manabrata Guha is an Assistant Professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies 
(NIAS), Bangalore.
184  ClAWS Journal l Summer 2011
the more conservatively inclined, NCW is simply the mode of operability that 
accompanies the digitisation of the conduct of war.2 This point of view holds that 
while strategy, operations, and tactics may be executed more efficiently — perhaps 
even differently — with the help of high-speed information and communication/
collaborative technologies (ICTs), this is to say that if they are digitised, the socio-
economic-cultural-political context in which these actions take place remains 
indisputable, axiomatic, immutable, and, therefore, a priori.3 Thus, it is suggested 
that “[t]here appears a unity to all strategic experiences, regardless of period, 
polity, or technology,”4 and as a consequence, it is further asserted that “while the 
character of war is subject to change, its nature must be, indeed is, eternal”.5 For the 
conservative theorists, NCW represents merely one such change in the character 
of war.6
In other words, while the more conservative military theorists do not 
underestimate the “power of the network”, they prefer to view the network as 
only an “enabler” that connects a diverse array of sensors and shooters (i.e., 
manned and unmanned weapon-platforms) with the objective of collapsing 
the time and distance that separates the two. To them, NCW is the modern and 
efficient way by which an armed force can integrate its kinetic forces to deliver a 
devastating impact on an adversary. Note, however, that the underlying premise 
of this point of view does not pay attention to, or take into account, the wider 
operative conditions within which these network-enabled operations unfold. 
The principal strategic consideration that guides what I have referred to above as 
the traditionalist approach to NCW is to assume and maintain a measured and 
balanced posture between “means” and “ends” with the strict injunction that the 
strategic objectives or “ends” will always take precedence over the “means”.7 It is 
for this reason that the conservative theorists view NCW in purely instrumental 
and technicist terms. To them, NCW is nothing more than a “means” to achieve 
and secure a strategic objective or end. In the process, however, I contend that 
this (traditionalist) perspective of NCW disregards (or, does not pay enough 
attention to) the import of what Manuel Castells refers to as the “rise of network 
societies” in the 21st century.
There is no denying the fact that increasingly “we live in confusing times” 
because “the intellectual categories that we use to understand what happens 
around us have been coined in different circumstances, and can hardly grasp 
what is new by referring to the past.”8 As Castells, through his patient and 
painstaking research points out, “Around the end of the second millennium 
of the common era, a number of major social, technological, economic, and 
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cultural transformations came together to give rise to a new form of society, 
the network society…”9 Gesturing to these emergent conditions, the second 
strain of thought regarding NCW which is, in many ways, a more radical one, 
asserts that
...[t]he information revolution is altering the nature of conflict across the 
spectrum…First, this revolution is favouring and strengthening network forms of 
organization, often giving them an advantage over hierarchical forms…Second, 
as the information revolution deepens, the conduct and outcome of conflicts 
increasingly…revolve around ‘knowledge’…Adversaries are learning to emphasize 
‘information operations’ and perception management…These propositions cut 
across the entire conflict spectrum (and thus) Information-age threats are likely to 
be more diffuse, dispersed, multi-dimensional, non-linear, and ambiguous…10
Thus,
…for myriad of reasons, the world is entering – indeed, it has already entered 
– a new epoch of conflict (and crime). This epoch will be defined not so much 
by whether there is more or less conflict than before, but by new dynamics and 
attributes of conflict...(C)hanges will involve high-tech sensors and weapons that 
can enable both stand-off and close-in swarming attacks…The protagonists…
will be more widely dispersed…more decentralized…and more surreptitious. 
Offence and defence will be blended. The temporal and spatial dimensions of 
conflict will be compressed.11
It is against this backdrop that these radical theorists of war and combat 
suggest that it is increasingly becoming necessary to “unfetter [ourselves] from 
the requirement to be synchronous in time and space…”12 They insist that the 
“time we live in [is] unlike any other, a time when the pace of change demands 
that we change…it is a time when our analysis methods are becoming less and 
less able to shed light on the choices we face.”13 Indeed, they assert that there is 
an urgent need to abandon the paradigm in which “…we still persist in studying 
a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again.”14 
Going even further, some theorists like Szafranski—when discussing war and 
its conduct in the Age of Information—call for different ‘modes of response’ to 
what he suggests are the emerging ‘epistemological challenges’ that modern-day 
governments and societies have to contend with.15
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Given this state of affairs, therefore, as the plans to transform the Indian 
armed forces into a net-centric ensemble mature, there is also an urgent and 
growing need – at a higher register of analysis – to resolve the conceptual (and, 
in this specific sense, strategic) dilemma that these two starkly different lines of 
thought about war and combat in the 21st century pose to us. At the heart of the 
matter lies one fundamental question: how to cognise (or, read) the emergent 
conditions within which such a network-enabled Indian military force is expected 
to operate?
While at first glance, this question may appear easy enough to address, 
however, a closer examination suggests that its apparent simplicity is deceptive. 
Consider, for example, the following: 
Between 1950 and 1980, the number of instructions per second that a dollar 
could buy [has] doubled every three years; since 1980, the number has doubled 
every sixteen to twenty months. In the first few years of the 1990s, the pace has, 
if anything, accelerated. [While] [s]ome slowdown is inevitable, but even at the 
1980s rate, a thousandfold improvement can be expected in sixteen years; at 
earlier rates, a leisurely thirty years. [Thus, by] the time this acceleration runs its 
course, life and war will have changed radically.16
libicki is not the only one to point out that, as the Age of Information 
progresses, “life and war will change radically”. Even the former US Secretary 
of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, had asserted that “[w]e need to change not only 
the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the hi-tech 
weapons in the world will not transform the US Armed Forces unless we transform 
the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight.”17
While it is relatively easier to relate to the conceptual premise of the 
traditional account of NCW, it is necessary to pause and reflect on what precisely 
theorists and practitioners of war like libicki, Rumsfeld, and the other radical 
theorists of NCW are urging us to do! What do they mean when they say that as 
we become more firmly ensconced within the Age of Information, “life and war 
will change radically”? Why are we being asked to change how we think about 
war? Indeed, how can we think about war differently? 
In the second decade of the 21st century, it would appear somewhat trite to 
simply say that we live in the Information Age. Perhaps it is more appropriate 
to say that we are finding ourselves in what I refer to as an Age of Interactive 
Emergencies. What are interactive emergencies? Simply put, in the Information 
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Age, given the increasingly immersive network of relations – material and non-
material – that we find ourselves within, an emergency – any emergency—being 
confronted by any state, group, institution, collective, individual, etc., spreads 
virally and becomes a concern for everyone (albeit in their own specific ways). 
This gives rise to what Antoine Bousquet refers to as “chaoplexic” conditions18 
– conditions that veer at the edge of chaos and complexity and which, in turn, 
contribute to the exponential growth of what Donald Rumsfeld quixotically 
referred to as “the unknown unknowns.” It is my contention that this is the 
fundamental conceptual premise from which the more radical and extreme 
theorists of war and combat theorise about NCW.
To them, NCW includes, but is not limited to, the hard or soft links that 
establish networks between the soldier, the sensor, and the weapon-platform. 
Instead, the network is, to use a technical-philosophical term, the “conditions of 
possibility” that determine the nature of war and combat in the 21st century. This 
brings in its wake the logical imperative to review, in the first instance, what it 
means to be at war, and how this war may be waged. Wars, these radical theorists 
assert, are gradually moving away from being purely state-centric phenomena. 
Thus, while not completely ruling out the possibility of inter-state wars, these 
theorists point out that increasingly wars will be small, inter-connected (thus, 
simultaneous), and many. Under these conditions, simply informationalising 
the armed forces is not enough.
Intimately connected to this is the nature of the “emergent adversary” of the 
Age of Interactive Emergencies. Given the base conditions – that of chaoplexy and 
where the proportion of the “unknown unknowns” is growing exponentially – the 
“emergent adversary” will – or so it is speculated – take an increasingly amorphous 
form. This lack of a strategic structure of the enemy poses, if nothing else, an 
operational problem for the stove-piped, albeit informationalised, organisational 
structure of the armed forces. But there is another aspect to this which complicates 
matters further. Not only is the “emergent enemy” amorphous, it also displays (or, 
is expected to increasingly display) a propensity to weaponise the terrain on which 
it wages war. It is important to recognise that this “terrain” is not the conventional 
geo-spatial terrain that we are more familiar with. Peculiarly, this terrain is both 
the space where newer forms of war will be waged and the space from which the 
“emergent adversary” originates. A corollary to this is that this terrain also serves 
as a space where the “emergent adversary” finds sanctuaries to which it withdraws 
only to launch a more devastating series of attacks at opportune moments. In such 
‘martial valhallas’ – increasingly underwritten by highly advanced, but relatively 
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easy to access, computing, communication, and collaborative technologies—
the traditional indicators of ‘speed’, ‘time’, and ‘identity’ will most likely collapse 
onto each other, thus, rendering the more familiar ‘gaps’ between the strategist’s 
projections, the general’s map table, and ‘the battle’ increasingly obsolete. Thus, 
in the Wars of the Small and the Many, the ‘hunter’ and the ‘hunted’, the ‘here’ and 
the ‘there’ and, the ‘actual’ and the ‘virtual’ will be experienced and projected as 
complex (and confusing) phenomena which are always on the verge of becoming 
indistinguishable from one another.19 
The “emergent adversary” also displays two characteristics – “asymmetry” and 
“asynchronicity” —that are, or should be, of interest to theorists and strategists of war 
and combat in the 21st century. It is necessary to clarify that these two characteristics, 
by themselves, are not essentially new to armed forces around the world. As Clausewitz 
explained in On War, the problems of asymmetry and asynchronicity were, and will 
remain, endemic to the battlefields of the past, present and future. He referred to this 
as the “fog and friction” of war.20 The critical difference, however, lies in the propensity 
of the “emergent adversary” to weaponise these two characteristics and to employ 
them in a form and manner that will threaten to subvert the somatic integrity of the 
traditionally organised armed forces. In other words, for the traditionally organised 
armed forces, albeit liberally upgraded with the most advanced ICTs and weapons-
related technologies, it will no longer be enough to simply contend with asymmetric 
and asynchronous conditions within the battlespace in the classical Clausewitzian 
sense. They will also have to devise ways and means by which to contend with 
these two phenomena which, in the context of the “emergent adversary” of the 21st 
century, are nothing less than extreme examples of innovative weaponisation that 
are specifically designed to introduce chaoplexic conditions within the structure of 
the armed forces, thereby destabilising them. For the Indian armed forces – indeed 
for any formalised fighting force – this is a particularly debilitating state of affairs.
Based on this, we can, therefore, be fairly certain that emergent forms of war 
will be characterised by “many”, “small”, and most likely, “simultaneous” violent 
interactions, which will spread virally; they will increasingly afford— particularly for 
the structured fighting formations of the nation-state—shorter lead-times within 
which to act; they will demand that the hierarchically organised armed forces 
respond – across the spectrum of possibilities—with lightning speed, and display 
a robust degree of flexibility and resilience when facing the “emergent adversary”. 
It is significant to note that despite the introduction and operationalisation of 
advanced ICTs and weapons-technologies, militaries globally remain woefully 
underprepared to address conditions and threats like these.
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The question, therefore, boils down to this: what will be the perspective that 
Indian strategists and defence planners will adopt as they deliberate on transforming 
the Indian armed forces into a network-enabled battle-worthy force? Will they adopt 
the more traditionalist approach that views net-centricity as simply an enabler to 
fight wars whose templates were designed for the Industrial Age, or, will they take 
the radical step to transform their cognitive framework which will allow them to re-
cognise the critical features of the emergent battlespaces and adversaries of the 21st 
century, thereby enabling them to redesign the transformation of (military) force 
with peculiarly Indian characteristics?
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